

**Fund description and summary of investment policy<sup>1</sup>**

The Fund is a feeder fund and invests only in the Orbis SICAV Global Balanced Fund ('Orbis Global Balanced'), managed by Allan Gray's offshore investment partner, Orbis Investment Management Limited. Orbis Global Balanced invests in a diversified global portfolio of equities, fixed income, and commodity-linked instruments. The typical net equity exposure of Orbis Global Balanced is between 40% and 75%. Orbis Global Balanced aims to balance investment returns and risk of loss. Returns are likely to be less volatile than those of a global equity-only fund. Although Orbis Global Balanced's investment universe is global, the units of the Fund are priced and traded daily in rands.

**ASISA unit trust category:** Global – Multi Asset – High Equity

**Fund objective and benchmark<sup>1</sup>**

The Fund aims to create long-term wealth for investors and to outperform its designated combined equity and bond performance benchmark, which comprises 60% the MSCI World Index with net dividends reinvested and 40% the J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Index.

**How we aim to achieve the Fund's objective**

The Fund invests solely in Orbis Global Balanced, which is actively managed and diversified across global equities, fixed income and commodity-linked instruments. Equity exposure typically ranges from 40% to 90%, but is intended to be limited at 75% after hedging. Fixed income ranges from 10% to 50%, and commodities from 0% to 10%. Asset allocation is driven by Orbis' bottom-up approach, focusing on individual security selection rather than benchmark weights. Like Allan Gray, Orbis uses in-house research to identify companies whose shares can be purchased for less than Orbis' assessment of their long-term intrinsic value. This long-term perspective enables them to buy shares which are shunned by the stock market because of their unexciting or poor short-term prospects, but which are relatively attractively priced if one looks to the long term. This same approach applies to fixed income, which typically includes cash, government bonds, and corporate bonds, to enhance risk-adjusted returns. Orbis may use hedged equities as a substitute for fixed income or alternatively to manage overall portfolio risk. Currency exposure is actively managed to avoid currencies unlikely to retain long-term value against the US dollar.

**Suitable for those investors who**

- Seek to balance investment returns and risk of loss, by investing in a diversified global multi-asset class portfolio
- Wish to invest in international assets through a rand-denominated fund
- Are comfortable that the investment approach is likely to result in volatility and potential capital loss, but typically less volatility than that of a global equity-only fund
- Typically have an investment horizon of at least three to five years

**Fund availability:** Subject to offshore capacity constraints. Please visit our website or contact our Client Service Centre for further information about any constraints that may apply.

**Meeting the Fund objective**


Since inception and over the latest 10- and five-year periods, the Fund has outperformed its benchmark. The Fund has provided returns in excess of CPI inflation for all three periods. The Fund experiences periods of underperformance in pursuit of its objective of creating long-term wealth for investors, without taking on greater risk of loss than similar funds in the Global – Multi Asset – High Equity sector.

**Fund information on 30 September 2025**

Fund size	R17.1bn
Number of units	175 215 237
Price (net asset value per unit)	R97.78
Class	A

**Performance net of all fees and expenses**

Value of R10 invested at inception with all distributions reinvested



1. The Fund was converted from a fund of funds structure to a feeder fund structure and its name and benchmark were amended on 1 June 2021. For more information, please read 'Ballot under way for Allan Gray-Orbis Global Fund of Funds', available via the Latest Insights section of our website.
2. 60% of the MSCI World Index with net dividends reinvested and 40% of the J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Index (source: Bloomberg), performance as calculated by Allan Gray as at 30 September 2025. From inception to 31 May 2021, the benchmark was 60% of the FTSE World Index including income and 40% of the J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Index.
3. This data reflects the latest available inflation numbers for South Africa and the United States of America, as at 31 August 2025 (Source: IRESS). South African CPI inflation has been calculated based on the most recent rebased values from Stats SA.
4. Maximum percentage decline over any period. The maximum rand drawdown occurred from 23 October 2008 to 14 October 2010 and maximum benchmark drawdown occurred from 23 October 2008 to 30 June 2009. Drawdown is calculated on the total return of the Fund/benchmark (i.e. including income).
5. The percentage of calendar months in which the Fund produced a positive monthly return since inception.
6. The standard deviation of the Fund's monthly return. This is a measure of how much an investment's return varies from its average over time.
7. These are the highest or lowest consecutive 12-month returns since inception. This is a measure of how much the Fund and the benchmark returns have varied per rolling 12-month period. The Fund's highest annual return occurred during the 12 months ended 31 December 2013 and the benchmark's occurred during the 12 months ended 31 December 2013. The Fund's lowest annual return occurred during the 12 months ended 31 October 2010 and the benchmark's occurred during the 12 months ended 30 June 2009. All rolling 12-month figures for the Fund and the benchmark are available from our Client Service Centre on request.

% Returns	Fund <sup>1</sup>		Benchmark <sup>1,2</sup>		CPI inflation <sup>3</sup>	
	ZAR	US\$	ZAR	US\$	ZAR	US\$
<b>Cumulative:</b>						
Since inception (3 February 2004)	1056.1	370.0	881.3	299.0	207.1	73.6
<b>Annualised:</b>						
Since inception (3 February 2004)	12.0	7.4	11.1	6.6	5.3	2.6
Latest 10 years	12.6	10.2	10.2	7.8	4.8	3.1
Latest 5 years	17.0	16.3	8.0	7.3	5.0	4.5
Latest 3 years	23.0	24.6	14.0	15.4	4.2	3.1
Latest 2 years	21.8	27.1	11.8	16.7	3.8	2.8
Latest 1 year	28.6	28.1	11.0	10.5	3.3	2.9
Year-to-date (not annualised)	22.6	33.4	4.2	13.3	3.3	2.2
<b>Risk measures (since inception)</b>						
Maximum drawdown <sup>4</sup>	-24.0	-37.0	-25.1	-37.5	n/a	n/a
Percentage positive months <sup>5</sup>	60.0	61.9	57.3	63.8	n/a	n/a
Annualised monthly volatility <sup>6</sup>	13.2	11.7	12.5	10.3	n/a	n/a
Highest annual return <sup>7</sup>	55.6	43.8	38.8	37.6	n/a	n/a
Lowest annual return <sup>7</sup>	-13.7	-27.3	-17.0	-31.7	n/a	n/a

**Income distributions for the last 12 months**

To the extent that income earned in the form of dividends and interest exceeds expenses in the Fund, the Fund will distribute any surplus annually.	<b>31 Dec 2024</b>
<b>Cents per unit</b>	<b>1.5499</b>

**Annual investment management fee**

Allan Gray does not charge an annual management fee but is paid a marketing and distribution fee by Orbis. Orbis charges a unique refundable performance-based fee in Orbis Global Balanced which is designed to align Orbis' interest with investor outcomes. The fee consists of a base fee and a refundable performance fee. In traditional fee structures, the total fee is paid to the manager immediately. When the Orbis fund outperforms, the performance fee is paid into a fee reserve and enables Orbis to refund investors if the Orbis fund subsequently underperforms. The table below summarises the fee parameters.

Initial, exit and switching fees	0.0%
Base fee	1.1%
Performance fee sharing rate	25% for out- and underperformance relative to the benchmark.
Performance fee benchmark	60% MSCI World Index with net dividends reinvested and 40% J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Index.
Fee reserve	Performance fees available for refund are shown below the TER table. <sup>9</sup>

The fee is calculated daily. After deducting the base fee, the fund's performance is compared to its benchmark. Orbis then shares in 25% of the value added or lost relative to the benchmark. This means the fee adjusts by 0.25% for every 1% of outperformance or underperformance.

The fee is uncapped when the Orbis fund outperforms. However, during periods of underperformance, the total fee can be negative, as performance fees can be refunded from the fee reserve. If the reserve is empty and underperformance continues, a high watermark ensures that fees are only charged once previous losses are recovered. The fee experience table illustrates what investors can expect during periods of out- and underperformance. When the fee reserve is positive, Orbis may earn one-third of the available performance fees, subject to a cap of 2.5% per year. For more information, please refer to the [fees resources](#) section of the Orbis website.

**Fee experience**

Out- and underperformance scenarios	+8%	+4%	0%	-4%	-8%
Base fee	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%
Performance fee or refund*	1.7%	0.7%	-0.3%	-1.3%	-2.3%
<b>Total annual management fee</b>	<b>2.8%</b>	<b>1.8%</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>-0.2%</b>	<b>-1.2%</b>

\*Illustrative only. If there is no refund available, the base fee is still charged.

**Total expense ratio (TER) and transaction costs (updated quarterly)**

The annual management fee charged by Orbis is included in the TER. The TER is a measure of the actual expenses incurred by the Fund over a one- and three-year period (annualised). Since Fund returns are quoted after deduction of these expenses, the TER should not be deducted from the published returns (refer to page 4 for further information). Transaction costs are disclosed separately.

**Asset allocation on 30 September 2025**

This fund invests solely into the Orbis SICAV Global Balanced Fund

Asset class	Total	United States	UK	Europe ex-UK <sup>8</sup>	Japan	Other <sup>8</sup>	Emerging markets
Net equities	60.9	14.7	11.4	9.4	5.1	5.3	15.1
Hedged equities	17.9	10.6	0.8	4.2	0.4	0.5	1.4
Property	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.3
Commodity-linked	4.6	4.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bonds	14.2	7.9	0.6	0.7	0.0	0.0	5.1
Money market and cash	1.4	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.2
<b>Total (%)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>38.3</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>22.1</b>
Currency exposure	100.0	21.9	11.7	26.8	13.6	11.9	14.1
Benchmark	100.0	63.7	4.6	17.1	9.5	5.1	0.0

8. Refers to developed markets only.

Note: There may be slight discrepancies in the totals due to rounding.

**Total expense ratio (TER) and transaction costs (updated quarterly)**

TER and transaction costs breakdown for the 1- and 3-year period ending 30 September 2025	1yr %	3yr %
<b>Total expense ratio</b>	<b>6.17</b>	<b>3.75</b>
Fee for benchmark performance	1.10	1.10
Performance fees <sup>9</sup>	5.00	2.59
Other costs excluding transaction costs	0.07	0.07
VAT	0.00	0.00
<b>Transaction costs (including VAT)</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.07</b>
<b>Total investment charge</b>	<b>6.26</b>	<b>3.82</b>

9. As at 30 September 2025, performance fees of 6.4% were available for refund in the event of subsequent underperformance.

**Top 10 holdings on 30 September 2025**

Company	% of portfolio
SPDR® Gold Trust	4.6
US TIPS >10 Years	3.9
Samsung Electronics	3.6
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg	3.5
Kinder Morgan	3.2
Siemens Energy	3.2
Newmont	2.6
Barrick Mining	2.6
Prysmian Group	2.4
Balfour Beatty	2.1
<b>Total (%)</b>	<b>31.7</b>

Say you're an economic policymaker – a president, finance minister or central banker. Decades of budget deficits have left your country with a growing debt problem, and markets are starting to sniff it out. What do you do about it? You have to do something. If you do nothing and markets call time on your debt problem, your days as a policymaker are numbered. You could attempt austerity – cut spending, increase taxes, or both, to balance your budget, and take your pain on the fiscal side to protect your currency and creditworthiness. Do austerity well, and both markets and historians may judge you kindly. Voters, however, will not. You could grow your way out. That's painless to promise but difficult to deliver. The easiest way to spur growth is to run larger deficits, which is exactly how you and your predecessors got into this mess.

For a government with a debt problem, most of the effective options aren't palatable, and most of the palatable options aren't effective. In our view, governments facing debt problems are likely to pursue the least painful option that offers some hope of success: financial repression.

#### What is financial repression?

"Financial repression" is when governments use policies to keep real interest rates low or negative while channelling money towards government debt.

The core problem is that the ratio of a government's debt to gross domestic product (debt-to-GDP ratio) is too high. Reducing debt outright is difficult, because it requires either austerity or a default. Simply boosting growth is also hard. Helpfully, the existing debt burden is fixed in nominal terms, while GDP is not. That difference opens up another path: inflate away the debt. If the government can find ways to suppress real (that is, inflation-adjusted) interest rates and bond yields, inflation can boost GDP and tax revenues without boosting debt or interest expense. In practice, this means using carrots and sticks to make government debt more attractive for non-yield reasons.

The US is the locus of our concerns. Its debt-to-GDP ratio is already at 100% and forecasted to grow to 150% and beyond. Unsurprisingly, efforts at financial repression are already underway.

#### The cost of obvious financial repression: a weaker currency

The most straightforward approach is yield curve control (YCC). With YCC, the central bank stands ready to buy as many government bonds as necessary to stop bond yields from rising above a certain level. This has a recent precedent. The Bank of Japan enforced YCC from late 2016 through early 2024, buying up about 40% of all outstanding Japanese government bonds to hold yields at low levels.

There are other obvious routes, such as capital controls. If you don't let people take money elsewhere, they're stuck with the options they have, including your government debt.

Japan's experiment illustrates the main pain of financial repression: a weaker currency. During the term of the programme, the yen depreciated by over 30% against the US dollar. A weaker currency is the natural result of suppressing yields. With bond returns eroded by inflation, investors flee from assets in the repressor's currency and into assets in currencies that better preserve purchasing power.

The flaw of the obvious approaches is that they are obvious, which threatens confidence. Shrewder approaches aim to hold down real yields while holding up confidence. This involves a wider range of sticks and carrots.

Banks' balance sheets make for attractive targets, and the scope to channel money into government debt is enormous. US commercial banks hold nearly US\$19 trillion of total assets but only US\$2 trillion of Treasuries, and they have US\$4 trillion of cash-like reserves parked with the US Federal Reserve (the Fed). Insurers, pension funds and stablecoins offer additional scope for a would-be repressor to direct money into government debt.

Regulation can make government debt more attractive, but a bigger prize would be stealth YCC by the Treasury. The US Treasury sells government debt, which affords it great influence over government bond yields.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has already announced that essentially all incremental borrowing will be done through bills, where demand remains plentiful. If he wishes, he could push this further, using tools already available. For over a decade, the Treasury has conducted buybacks of government bonds. Under Bessent, the Treasury has doubled the frequency of these buybacks and modestly increased their size. Large buybacks of discounted old bonds could increase interest expense in the short term but would mechanically improve the headline debt-to-GDP ratio.

Concentrating borrowing in short-term bills has other advantages. If more of the debt is short term, more of the interest expense will be at short-term rates. Those rates, in turn, are tightly controlled by the Fed. If you can borrow at rates set by the Fed, then cajole the Fed into lowering rates, the government can save on interest expense.

#### Investment implications: beware higher inflation and a weaker dollar

The US pursuing financial repression is no sure thing, but stacking up policymakers' incentives, it seems plausible to us.

If the US tries to hold down interest rates while letting inflation run hot, two conclusions are clear: Holders of conventional bonds will suffer as inflation erodes their purchasing power, and the US dollar will weaken against real assets and other currencies. Our financial repression concerns inform three of the Fund's major positions: our preference for inflation-linked bonds, gold-related holdings and caution on the US dollar.

It is a political truism that policymakers live in fear of the bond market. But if financial repression becomes the preferred path out of debt problems, the bond market should also fear policymakers.

In the last quarter, we added to positions in a US-based managed care organisation and a US-based clinical research company. We funded these purchases by trimming positions in Nintendo and Siemens Energy into share price strength.

**Adapted from a commentary contributed by Rob Perrone, Orbis Portfolio Management (Europe) LLP, London**

## Fund manager quarterly commentary as at 30 September 2025

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Allan Gray Unit Trust Management (RF) (Pty) Ltd (the "Management Company") is registered as a management company under the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002, in terms of which it operates unit trust portfolios under the Allan Gray Unit Trust Scheme, and is supervised by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA). The Management Company is incorporated under the laws of South Africa and has been approved by the regulatory authority of Botswana to market its unit trusts in Botswana, however, it is not supervised or licensed in Botswana. Allan Gray (Pty) Ltd (the "Investment Manager"), an authorised financial services provider, is the appointed investment manager of the Management Company and is a member of the Association for Savings & Investment South Africa (ASISA). The trustee/custodian of the Allan Gray Unit Trust Scheme is Rand Merchant Bank, a division of FirstRand Bank Limited. The trustee/custodian can be contacted at RMB Custody and Trustee Services: Tel: +27 (0)11 301 6335 or www.rmb.co.za.

### Performance

Collective investment schemes in securities (unit trusts or funds) are generally medium- to long-term investments. The value of units may go down as well as up and past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Movements in exchange rates may also cause the value of underlying international investments to go up or down. The Management Company does not provide any guarantee regarding the capital or the performance of the Fund. Performance figures are provided by the Investment Manager and are for lump sum investments with income distributions reinvested. Actual investor performance may differ as a result of the investment date, the date of reinvestment and dividend withholding tax.

### Fund mandate

Funds may be closed to new investments at any time in order to be managed according to their mandates. Unit trusts are traded at ruling prices and can engage in borrowing and scrip lending. The funds may borrow up to 10% of their market value to bridge insufficient liquidity.

### Unit price

Unit trust prices are calculated on a net asset value basis, which is the total market value of all assets in the Fund, including any income accruals and less any permissible deductions from the Fund, divided by the number of units in issue. Forward pricing is used and fund valuations take place at approximately 16:00 each business day. Purchase and redemption requests must be received by the Management Company by 14:00 each business day to receive that day's price. Unit trust prices are available daily on www.allangray.co.za.

### Fees

Permissible deductions may include management fees, brokerage, securities transfer tax, auditor's fees, bank charges and trustee fees. A schedule of fees, charges and maximum commissions is available on request from Allan Gray. For more information about our annual management fees, refer to the [frequently asked questions](#), available via the Allan Gray website.

### Total expense ratio (TER) and transaction costs

The total expense ratio (TER) is the annualised percentage of the Fund's average assets under management that has been used to pay the Fund's actual expenses over the past one- and three-year periods. The TER includes the annual management fees that have been charged (both the fee at benchmark and any performance component charged), VAT and other expenses like audit and trustee fees. Transaction costs (including brokerage, securities transfer tax, Share Transactions Totally Electronic (STRATE) and FSCA Investor Protection Levy and VAT thereon) are shown separately. Transaction costs are necessary costs in administering the Fund and impact Fund returns. They should not be considered in isolation as returns may be impacted by many other factors over time, including market returns, the type of financial product, the investment decisions of the investment manager, and the TER. Since Fund returns are quoted after the deduction of these expenses, the TER and transaction costs should not be deducted again from published returns. As unit trust expenses vary, the current TER cannot be used as an indication of future TERs. A higher TER does not necessarily imply a poor return, nor does a low TER imply a good return. Instead, when investing, the investment objective of the Fund should be aligned with the investor's objective and compared against the performance of the Fund. The TER and other funds' TERs should then be used to evaluate whether the Fund performance offers value for money. The sum of the TER and transaction costs is shown as the total investment charge (TIC).

### Feeder fund

A feeder fund is a unit trust that invests in another single unit trust, which charges its own fees. Allan Gray does not charge any additional fees in its feeder funds.

### FTSE Russell Index

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